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Abstract: This paper investigates if there is a difference in the level of the credit 
risk of Islamic as compared to the level of credit risk of conventional banks. This 
paper further investigates the importance of various credit risk determinants 
and possible differences in how such determinants affect credit risk in Islamic 
and conventional banking industries. This paper employs dynamic panel 
regressions using system GMM estimators. The sample includes 11 Islamic and 
95 conventional banks in Indonesia throughout 2003-2018. Based on the 
results, it is concluded that there is no difference in the level of the credit risk of 
Islamic as compared to that of conventional banks. It is also concluded that 
credit risk is significantly affected by current and lagged asset size, lagged 
financing, current profitability, lagged economic growth, and current inflation. 
The effect of lagged financing, current profitability, and lagged economic growth 
is different in Islamic and conventional banking. 
Keywords: credit risk; islamic bank; conventional bank 
Abstrak: Makalah ini menganalisis apakah terdapat perbedaan antara tingkat 
risiko kredit pada perbankan syariah dan tingkat risiko kredit pada perbankan 
konvensional. Makalah ini selanjutnya juga menganalisis signifikansi faktor-
faktor yang diduga mempengaruhi risiko kredit dan kemungkinan perbedaan 
pengaruh faktor-faktor tersebut terhadap risiko kredit pada perbankan syariah 
dibandingkan pada perbankan konvensional. Makalah ini menggunakan regresi 
panel dinamis dengan system generalized method of moments (GMM) 
estimator. Sampel dalam makalah ini mencakup 11 bank syariah dan 95 bank 
konvensional di Indonesia selama periode 2003-2018. Berdasarkan hasil 
analisis, dapat disimpulkan bahwa tidak terdapat perbedaan perbedaan antara 
tingkat risiko kredit pada perbankan syariah dan tingkat risiko kredit pada 
perbankan konvensional. Begitu pula, dapat disimpulkan bahwa risiko kredit 
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secara signifikan dipengaruhi oleh ukuran aset tahun ini dan tahun lalu, 
pembiayaan tahun lalu, profitabilitas tahun ini, pertumbuhan ekonomi tahun 
lalu dan inflasi tahun ini. Pengaruh pembiayaan tahun lalu, profitabilitas tahun 
ini, dan pertumbuhan ekonomi tahun lalu, secara khusus berbeda pada 
perbankan syariah dibandingkan pada perbankan konvensional. 
Kata Kunci: resiko kredit; bank syariah; bank konvensional 
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Banks' credit risk signals crises (Reinhart and Rogoff 2010; Nkusu 2011; 
Louzis, Vouldis, and Metaxas 2012). However, the chain from credit risk hikes 
to banks' crises and crises to banking and economic crises is very short. 
Deterioration in the quality of banks' credit portfolios can destroy the business 
of the corresponding banks and put the banking system and the economy as a 
whole into jeopardy. 
Investigation on the factors that determine credit risk is hence of essential 
concern. This is particularly true in countries where Islamic banks exist along 
with conventional banks. Despite findings currently available in the banking 
literature (Naili and Lahrichi 2020; Onmus-Baykal 2010), understanding the 
nature of credit risk faced by Islamic banks compared to credit risk faced by 
conventional banks remains far from complete. Several authors point out that 
the Islamic banking industry's profit and loss sharing mechanism brings about 
inherent risks in Islamic bank operation, one of which is credit risk (Errico and 
Farahbaksh 2001). Several other authors also point out that credit risk in the 
Islamic banking industry does not include credit risk in the exactly 
conventional sense (Elgari 2003; Ardevol et al. 2016). Therefore, credit risk in 
the Islamic banking industry may be affected differently by its determinants 
than credit risk in the conventional banking industry. 
The majority of studies in the past focus either on the Islamic banking 
industry (Johansson et al. 2007; Misman et al. 2015; Munn et al. 2015) or the 
conventional banking industry (Naili and Lahrichi 2020). This hampers the 
possibility of directly comparing the level of credit risk and how credit risk is 
affected by its determinants in the two banking industries. More recent studies 
cover both Islamic and conventional banks in the sample (Abedifar, Molyneux, 
and Tarazi 2013; Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Merrouche 2013; Kabir, 
Worthington, and Gupta 2015; Lassoued 2018; Louhichi and Boujelbene 
2016) but limit their analysis to the difference in the level of credit risk rather 
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than going further to analyze the relative importance of the determinants of 
credit risk in the two banking industries. Another study (Akram and Rahman 
2018) covers both Islamic and conventional banks in the sample, but instead 
of making direct comparisons on the level of credit risk and its determinants, 
it focuses more on credit risk management scenarios. 
This paper attempts to analyze if there is a difference in the level of 
Islamic banks' credit risk compared to the level of the credit risk of 
conventional banks. This paper further attempts to analyze the statistical 
importance of various credit risk determinants and the possible difference in 
how credit risk is affected by such determinants in the Islamic banking 
industry compared to that in the conventional banking industry. This paper 
employs dynamic panel regressions with an unbalanced annual panel dataset 
of commercial banks in Indonesia to achieve its objectives. The sample in this 
paper includes 11 Islamic and 95 conventional banks, representing nearly 95 
percent share of the country's banking industry assets.  
The primary finding is that there is no significant difference in Islamic 
banks' credit risk level compared to that of conventional banks. The other 
primary finding is that credit risk is significantly affected by current and lagged 
asset size, lagged financing, current profitability, lagged economic growth, and 
current inflation. Here, the way lagged financing, current profitability, and 
lagged economic growth affect credit risk differs in Islamic and conventional 
banking industries. 
This paper relates to the existing literature in the following way. Firstly, 
similar to that of Kabir et al. (2015), Louhichi & Boujelbene (2016), and 
Lassoued (2018), it presents evidence on the level of the credit risk of Islamic 
banks as directly compared to the credit risk of conventional banks. However, 
in contrast to these works measuring credit risk using the distance-to-default 
(DD) and/or Z-score, respectively, this paper relies exclusively on Non 
Performing Financing (NPF) and Non Performing Loans (NPL) ratio as a 
measure of credit risk. This paper also differs from the above works in that it 
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extends the analysis of credit risk by looking at possible differences in the way 
credit risk is affected by its determinants in Islamic and conventional banking 
industries. Secondly, this paper compares the level of credit risk in Islamic and 
conventional banking industries in Indonesia rather than examining cross-
country data (Kabir, Worthington, and Gupta 2015; Louhichi and Boujelbene 
2016). This paper, in this regard, complements previous works focusing on 
single country data, such as the ones on Malaysia (Lassoued 2018) and 
Pakistan (Akram and Rahman 2018). Single country data allow for less 
unobserved heterogeneity in the factors that affect credit risk, reducing 
potential bias in the analysis.. 
Literature review  
Following the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCSB), credit 
risk is defined as the potential that a bank borrower or counterparty fails to 
meet its obligations following agreed terms. In the conventional banking 
industry, credit risk is unequivocally associated with the lending activities of 
banks. It simply reflects the risk of loans not being repaid. Credit risk is 
associated with banks' financing activities conditional on the schemes applied 
(Elgari 2003; Ardevol et al. 2016). The financing schemes include mainly 
mudarabah, musharakah, ijara and murabahah. 
Mudarabah is a financing contract in which a bank provides capital to its 
partners through a pre-agreed profit-sharing arrangement. Any profit will be 
shared according to the agreed arrangement, while the bank will bear the loss 
on the condition that it is not caused by partners' negligence (Fatihah, 
Kebangsaan, and Permata 2019). Meanwhile, musharakah is a joint venture 
contract in which two parties –a bank and its partners– contribute capital and 
managerial ability in a pre-agreed arrangement. Any profit will be shared 
according to the agreed arrangement, while the loss will be shared according 
to the proportion of the capital contributed (Samad, Gardner, and Cook 2005). 
Credit risk in mudarabah and musharakah arises from the potential that 
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bank's partners fail to make payments due to incompetence in managing the 
business. This is pertinent, especially in the presence of adverse selection. 
Besides, the risk arises from the fact that there is asymmetric information 
between the bank and its partners (who actively manage the business), 
opening the chance for fraud. Ijarah is a contract in which a bank leases out an 
asset to its lessee and receives rent payments over a specified period. Credit 
risk in ijarah arises from the potential that bank lessees fail to make payments 
when rent is due. Lastly, Murabaha is a contract in which a bank buys an 
investment good specified by its clients and sells it with an agreed margin. 
Payments are then made in installment or lump sum at a future date (Samad, 
Gardner, and Cook 2005). Credit risk in murabahah arises from the potential 
that the bank's clients fail to make installment payments or lump sums 
according to the agreed terms. Credit risk in murabahah is similar to credit risk 
from banks' lending activities in the conventional banking industry. 
Thus, it is clear that credit risk in the Islamic banking industry does not 
include credit risk in the conventional sense. However, it shares the crucial 
feature of credit risk in the conventional banking industry, namely the 
potential of capital impairment.  
Theoretically, it can be expected that the level of credit risk in the Islamic 
banking industry is higher than the level of credit risk in the conventional 
banking industry. In the presence of adverse selection, it is the tendency of 
those whose business is particularly risky or those with less competence in 
managing the business to demand mudarabah and musharakah from Islamic 
banks. Besides, asymmetric information between the banks and their partners 
in mudarabah and musharakah schemes also opens the chance for fraud. 
These will increase the potential that banks' partners will fail to make 
payments and the probability of banks having impaired capital (Khan 2010). 
Empirical evidence reported by Kabir et al. (2015) and Lassoued (2018) 
supports the above theoretical prediction that credit risk in Islamic banking is 
higher than credit risk in conventional banking. 
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Further, as credit risk in the Islamic banking industry does not include 
credit risk in the exactly conventional sense (Elgari 2003; Ardevol et al. 2016), 
theoretically, it is possible that the way credit risk is affected by its 
determinants in the Islamic banking industry differs from that in the 
conventional banking industry. Therefore, to follow previous studies 
identifying different factors that affect credit risk (S. Ghosh 2015; Louzis, 
Vouldis, and Metaxas 2012; Johansson et al. 2007), the determinants of credit 
risk consist of bank-specific macroeconomic variables. 
The importance of credit risk of bank-specific variables can be explained 
within several different hypotheses. The most central are hypotheses derived 
from the agency theory framework (Jensen and Meckling 1976). This 
framework discusses a situation where one party (the principal) engages 
another party (the agents) to perform tasks on her behalf. Since the incentives 
faced by the principal and the agents are not perfectly aligned and the 
principal tends to be less informed than the agents, the agents may 
consequently be tempted to act in their interest rather than in the interest of 
the principal. 
Based on the agency theory framework, it can be expected that the size of 
banks' assets affects credit risk negatively. A larger asset size allows banks to 
diversify. A larger asset size also allows banks to develop better systems of 
information. This improves the quality of loan management and increases the 
possibility of disclosing managers' unobservable behaviors concerning loan 
underwriting and monitoring (Johansson et al. 2007). Nonetheless, according 
to the "too big to fail" hypothesis (Stern and Feldman 2004). "Too big to fail" 
refers to the notion that larger banks are too vital to the economy that it would 
be dreadful if the government let them go bankrupt. Knowing that they would 
be saved in the event of failure, larger banks may opt to reduce their loan 
management efforts. This may lead to lower quality of loan portfolios and, 
consequently, increases credit risk. Empirical evidence in Haryono, Ariffin, 
and Hamat (2016), Zribi and Boujelbène (2011), and several other studies 
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tend to support the "diversification" hypothesis over the "too big to fail" 
hypothesis. 
Irrespective of whether a bank uses its capital or relies on savers' 
deposits to fund lending, the rate of return required by its shareholders 
remains typically high. Facing this incentive, managers will behave differently 
in different capital conditions. For example, managers will limit loans to less 
risky portfolios when the bank's capital ratio is high and has ample financial 
capital to fund lending. By contrast, when the bank's capital is eroded, and the 
bank has to rely on savers' deposits to fund lending, managers will tolerate 
riskier loan portfolios to achieve the required rate of return (Berger and 
DeYoung 1997). Thus, the expectation is that the effect of bank capital on 
credit risk is negative. 
Following two competing hypotheses, namely "bad management" and 
"skimping" hypotheses, there are two explanations for how inefficiency affects 
credit risk. The first explanation is based on the idea that higher inefficiency 
reflects bad cost management practices and that a bank suffering from such 
practices may also suffer from lousy loan management practices. Managers 
who cannot fully perform cost management may also be unable to perform 
loan underwriting and monitoring fully. Thus, based on this "bad 
management" hypothesis, it is likely that inefficiency has a positive 
relationship with credit risk (Berger and DeYoung 1997). The second 
explanation is based on the idea that higher inefficiency requires cost-cutting 
practices and that a bank committing such practices may have to devote fewer 
resources for loan management. The skimping on the resources devoted to 
underwriting and monitoring loans bears the consequences of more 
considerable credit risk in the future. Thus, based on this "skimping" 
hypothesis, it is likely that inefficiency has a negative relationship with credit 
risk (Berger and DeYoung 1997). In Salas and Saurina (2002), it is reported 
that the effect of efficiency on credit risk is not significant. Other empirical 
evidence, however, tends to favor the "bad management" (Berger and 
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DeYoung 1997; Louzis, Vouldis, and Metaxas 2012; Podpiera and Weill 2008) 
over the "skimping" hypothesis. 
Existing studies highlight two opposing hypotheses for effect on the 
credit risk of income diversification. The first hypothesis is the 
"diversification" hypothesis. Banks with more diversified income can generate 
income from sources other than lending, such as payments and brokerage. 
These banks, therefore, have fewer incentives to get involved in speculative 
projects. Moreover, compared to their peers whose income is less diversified, 
banks with more diversified income may benefit from informational-cost 
synergies and the expansion of client relationships (Abedifar et al. 2015), 
which in turn reduce their credit risk. Thus, based on the "diversification" 
hypothesis, income diversification associates negatively with credit risk. 
Nonetheless, having more diversified activities may induce conflicts of 
interest. It may also complicate banks' activities monitoring (Barth, Caprio, 
and Levine 2004) such that the quality of loan portfolios deteriorates. Thus, 
following this "complexity" hypothesis, the effect on the credit risk of income 
diversification is positive. However, research by Stiroh (2004) and Louzis et 
al. (2012) reported that the effect of income diversification on credit risk is not 
significant. Meanwhile, the evidence in Abedifar et al. Abedifar et al. (2015) 
indicates that the effect of income diversification on credit risk is negative, 
lending support for the "diversification" hypothesis over the "complexity" 
hypothesis. 
Banks are engaged in loan market share competitions. To boost market 
share, banks may upsurge their loan growth, either by trimming down the 
interest rate they charge, downgrading the loan requirements, or both 
(Keeton 1999). This increases the possibility of the banks having low-quality 
loan portfolios. Moreover, an upsurge in loans growth reduces banks' ability 
to scrutinize loans. Therefore, banks with higher loans growth have to deal 
with higher credit risk than their peers with lower loans growth. Empirical 
studies Espinoza and Prasad (2010), Jimenez and Saurina (2006), and 
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Quagliariello (2007) find a significant effect of credit expansion on credit risk. 
It is accordingly expected that the effect of loans growth on credit risk is 
positive. 
Back to the agency theory framework. Profit indicates a healthy principal-
agent relationship. Managers working for highly profitable banks are less need 
to create revenue than their peers working for banks with a lower profit. This 
reduces their incentives to take more risk from lending. Empirical evidence in 
Ghosh (2015), Chaibi and Ftiti (2015), and Haryono, Ariffin, and Hamat (2016) 
substantiate the idea that banks with a higher profit have lower credit risk 
than their peers with a lower profit (Boudriga, Taktak, and Jellouli 2009). It is 
therefore expected that the effect of profitability on credit risk is negative. 
The importance of credit risk of macroeconomic variables can be 
explained within the framework of the life-cycle consumption model. 
Lawrence (1995) uses a two-period life-cycle consumption model to study the 
impact of a default option. The option causes a kink in both the line of the 
budget and the indifference curve, implying that individuals with different 
income levels will have different optimal consumptions. In periods of slower 
economic growth, borrowers experience a higher risk of facing 
unemployment. Borrowers will therefore have higher rates of default. By 
contrast, borrowers will have lower default rates in periods of faster economic 
growth as they experience a lower risk of facing unemployment. Taking an 
additional assumption that individuals borrow from banks to invest in 
tangible or financial assets, Rinaldi and Sanchis-Arellano (2006) extend 
Lawrence's model and show that changes in the lending market structure 
significantly affect the amount of borrowing. In addition to economic growth, 
other macroeconomic variables such as unemployment and inflation are also 
crucial for credit risk as they can worsen the indebtedness to income ratio. 
Empirical evidence suggests that the effect of economic growth on credit risk 
is always negative (Tripodi 2001; Dimitrios, Helen, and Mike 2016; Chaibi and 
Ftiti 2015; S. Ghosh 2015; Louhichi and Boujelbene 2016). The effects of 
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unemployment and inflation are respectively positive and negative but not 
always significant. 
Many banks belong to individual investors. Large-block shareholders 
own many others. The concentration of ownership may increase 
shareholders' incentive to monitor banks' performance (Junarsin and 
Ismiyanti 2009) and impose management discipline. As a result, banks with 
more concentrated ownership are better managed and have a more 
conservative attitude toward risk than those with dispersed ownership. 
Empirical evidence supports this prediction (Shehzad, de Haan, and Scholtens 
2010; Barry, Lepetit, and Tarazi 2011). It can therefore be expected that 
ownership concentration relates negatively to credit risk.  
Despite objectives to address market failures and maximize social 
welfare, government-owned banks may suffer from politically induced 
misallocation of loans (Banerjee 1997; Hart, Shleifer, and Vishny 1997). Banks 
owned by the government may therefore have higher credit risk relative to 
those owned by private enterprises. Earlier empirical studies report 
inconsistent results. Iannotta, Nocera, and Sironi (2007) and Iannotta, Nocera, 
and Sironi (2013) find that government-owned banks are highly associated 
with credit risk, while Brown and Dinç (2011) and Cornett et al. (2010) find 
reverse results. Hu, Li, and Chiu (2004) indicate that government ownership 
and credit risk depend on the shareholding ratio. 
As credit risk in the Islamic banking industry does not include credit risk 
in the exactly conventional sense (Elgari 2003; T. Khan and Ahmed 2001), the 
way it is affected by bank-specific and macroeconomic variables above may 
differ compared to credit risk in the conventional banking industry.  
Methods 
The data in this paper span between 2003 and 2018. By the end of this 
period, there were 113 commercial banks in Indonesia. However, seven banks 
are left out of the sample due to a recent merger or recent conversion from 
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conventional to Islamic banks. Thus, the final sample includes 106 banks, 
which consist of 11 Islamic and 95 conventional banks. 
The data are analyzed using dynamic panel regressions based on system 
generalized method of moments (GMM) estimators (Arellano and Bover 
1995; Blundell and Bond 1998). These estimators permit not only to rely on 
internal instruments to control endogeneity problems but also to include 
time-invariant regressors. 
The primary regression equation is given by 
𝑌𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛿𝑌𝑖,𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝛽2𝑗𝑋𝑖,𝑡−𝑠
𝑗𝐽





𝑑=1 + 𝑖,𝑡  (1) 
where 𝑌𝑖,𝑡  denotes the logit transformation of NPF or NPL ratio for bank 
𝑖 at the end of period 𝑡 and 𝑌𝑖,𝑡−1 denotes the dependent variable lagged by 
one period. The alphabet 𝑋𝑗  denotes a vector of bank-specific variables, while 
𝑋𝑘  Denotes a vector of macroeconomic variables. The alphabet 𝑋𝑑  Denotes a 
vector of dummy variables, one of which is a dummy valued one if the bank is 
an Islamic bank and 0 otherwise. The alphabets 𝛿 and 𝛽s denote the 
coefficients to be estimated in the regression and 𝑖,𝑡  Denotes the error term. 
The critical variable of interest, credit risk, is measured using either non 
performing financing (NPF) or non performing loans (NPL) ratio. NPF refers 
to the proportion of financing in default or close to default in Islamic banking, 
while NPL refers to a similar proportion in conventional banking. Despite 
several criticisms, NPF and NPL are economically intuitive and very popular 
Kabir et al. (2015) and Haryono et al. (2016) for other uses of NPF ratio and 
Berger and DeYoung (1997), Hippolyte (2005) and Ghosh (2015) for other 
uses of NPL ratio. Following Espinosa and Prasad (2011), Klein (2013), and 
Ghosh (2015), NPF and NPL ratios are further expressed as log(NPF/(1-NPF)) 
or log(NPL/1-NPL)). Such transformation allows the value of credit risk to 
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span and be distributed symmetrically over the interval [−∞; +∞] instead of 
just [0.0; +1]. Such transformation also prevents the presence of nonnormality 
in the error term and accounts for possible nonlinearities. 
The vector of bank-specific variables consists of bank asset size, 
capitalization, efficiency, financing or loan growth, income diversification, 
inefficiency, and profitability. Bank size, capitalization, and efficiency are 
measured using the log of total assets, the equity-to-total-assets ratio, and the 
noninterest-expenses-to-total-assets ratio. Financing or loan growth is 
measured using the financing-to-total-assets ratio. Finally, income 
diversification is measured using the noninterest-incomes-to-total-operating-
incomes ratio, while profitability is proxied using the net-pre-tax-income-to-
total-assets ratio (commonly known as return on assets, ROA). 
The data for bank-specific variables are obtained from audited financial 
reports published by each bank. These reports have been prepared and 
presented standardized, making it possible to have meaningful comparisons 
over time and across banks.  
The vector of macroeconomic variables consists of economic growth, 
unemployment, and inflation. Economic growth is measured using real GDP 
growth. Unemployment refers to the percentage of unemployed in the labor 
force. However, rather than its original measure, unemployment is expressed 
as the percent change in the unemployed labor force. Inflation, which refers to 
the increase in the price level over time, is expressed as the percent change in 
the consumer price index (CPI). The data for economic growth, 
unemployment, and inflation are obtained from the Statistics Agency of 
Indonesia (BPS). 
To take into account the effects of ownership concentration and 
ownership status, four dummy variables are constructed. The first is a dummy 
value of 1 if the largest share of a bank's ownership is more than 50 percent 
and 0 otherwise. The second is a dummy valued one if a bank is owned by 
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foreign entities and 0 otherwise. The third is a dummy taking the value one if 
local governments and 0 own a bank otherwise, while the fourth is a dummy 
valued one if a bank is owned by the central government and 0 otherwise. 
Table 1 provides a brief description of the above variables and their summary 
statistics.  
In the regression estimations, bank-specific variables are treated as 
weakly exogenous. Their values are assumed to be affected by the past NPF or 
NPL ratio but not by the current. For these variables, only current and lagged 
values can be used as valid instruments. Macroeconomic variables are treated 
as strictly exogenous. Their past and future values are assumed to not 
correlate with the error term. Similarly, dummy variables are treated as 
strictly exogenous, meaning that their past and future values are assumed 
uncorrelated with the error term. 
Table 1. Description of variables 
Variables Description Source Mean N 
Bank specific variables    
Size  Log of total assets OJK 16.189 1,217 
Capitalization  Equity-to-assets-ratio OJK 0.143 1,217 
Inefficiency Noninterest-expenses-to-
assets ratio 
OJK 0.052 1,217 
Financing growth Financing-to-assets ratio OJK 0.617 1,217 
Income div. Nonfinancing income-to-op 
income ratio 
OJK 0.144 1,217 
Profitability Net-pre-tax-income-to-assets 
ratio 
OJK 1.789 1,217 
Macroeconomic variables    
Economic growth Percent change in real GDP BPS 5.458 1,217 
Unemployment Percent change in the labor 
force unemployed 
BPS -4.092 1,217 
Inflation Percent change in the 
consumer price index 
BPS 5.712 1,217 
 
Comparing Credit Risk in Islamic and Conventional … 
Economica: Jurnal Ekonomi Islam – Volume 11, Nomor 2 (2020) 
https://journal.walisongo.ac.id/index.php/economica 
| 249 
Arellano-Bond tests for zero autocorrelation are conducted to ensure 
that the results are consistent and no second-order serial correlation exists in 
the first difference of the error terms. Besides, to ensure the validity of the 
lagged dependent variable and some other variables as instruments, Sargan 
tests of overidentification are also conducted. Finally, pre-estimation checks 
using Fisher-type Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests indicate that all non-
dummy bank-specific and macroeconomic variables are stationary, meaning 
that their mean, variance, and autocovariance are invariant over time.  
Result and discussion 
Table 2 presents the basic regression results. In column 1, only bank-
specific variables are included in the regression. The lagged dependent 
variable is a dummy for Islamic banks, a dummy for 50 percent ownership 
concentration, and a dummy for foreign banks and local-government-owned 
banks, central-government-owned banks, respectively. In column 2, 
macroeconomic variables are added to the regression. Finally, in column 3, a 
dummy for the 2008 global financial crisis and a dummy for the post-global 
financial crisis are also added into the regression. Pointedly, in these three 
columns, the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable is significant at the 1 
percent level. The dynamic specification of the regression is thus justified. 
The coefficient of the dummy for Islamic banks is not statistically 
significant. Therefore, there is no indication that the level of the credit risk of 
Islamic banks differs from the level of the credit risk of conventional banks. 
This contrasts with the findings in Kabir et al. (2015) and Lassoued (2018). 
For example, Kabir et al. (2015) find that Islamic banks have significantly 
lower credit risk when DD measures credit risk but higher credit risk when Z-
score and NPF ratio are used instead. Similarly, Lassoued (2018) finds that the 
level of the credit risk of Islamic banks is higher than the level of the credit risk 
of conventional banks.  
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Table 2. The difference in the level of credit risk 
 System GMM Estimators 
Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 3 
Lagged dependent variable  0.647*** 0.637*** 0.627*** 
 (0.057) (0.060) (0.059) 
Dummy for Islamic banks -0.043 -0.035 -0.036 
 (0.166) (0.136) (0.146) 
Bank asset size  -0.681** -0.764** -0.763** 
 (0.305) (0.292) (0.294) 
Bank asset size (t-1) 0.696** 0.825*** 0.824*** 
 (0.278) (0.277) (0.283) 
Bank capitalization  -1.039 -0.917 -0.621 
 (1.449) (1.360) (1.318) 
Bank capitalization (t-1) -0.447 -0.136 0.028 
 (1.666) (1.558) (1.612) 
Bank inefficiency -0.945 -1.541 -1.884 
 (2.080) (2.077) (1.695) 
Bank inefficiency (t-1) -2.051 -2.406 -2.839* 
 (1.858) (1.690) (1.698) 
Bank financing -1.148* -0.951 -0.698 
 (0.643) (0.596) (0.598) 
Bank financing (t-1) 2.391*** 2.274*** 2.660*** 
 (0.621) (0.656) (0.701) 
Bank income diversification 0.556 0.531 0.693 
 (0.486) (0.487) (0.431) 
Bank income diversification (t-1) -1.012 -0.737 -0.466 
 (0.796) (0.828) (0.867) 
Bank profitability -0.099** -0.094** -0.090** 
 (0.049) (0.047) (0.045) 
Bank profitability (t-1) 0.002 0.001 -0.000 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Economic growth  -0.019 -0.028 
  (0.066) (0.062) 
Economic growth (t-1)  -0.159** -0.139* 
  (0.078) (0.081) 
Unemployment  -0.002 -0.001 
  (0.004) (0.005) 
Unemployment (t-1)  0.006 0.005 
  (0.004) (0.004) 
Inflation  0.033*** 0.021* 
  (0.010) (0.011) 
Inflation (t-1)  0.021** 0.015 
  (0.009) (0.011) 
N observations 1,217 1,217 1,217 
N banks 106 106 106 
Second order test 0.849 0.877 0.876 
Hansen test 0.211 0.184 0.284 
Note: Each regression includes a constant, a dummy for 50 percent ownership concentration, a 
dummy for foreign banks, a dummy for local-government-owned banks and a dummy for central -
government-owned banks. In addition, regression 3 includes a dummy for the 2008 global financial 
crisis and a dummy for post crisis . Values in parentheses refer to robust standard errors. ***, ** and 
* denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level respectively.  
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One possible explanation for the no-difference finding in this paper is that 
the share of the Islamic banking industry to the entire national banking 
industry in Indonesia is too tiny compared to the share of the Islamic banking 
industry in Malaysia and Pakistan. By the end of 2018, the share of the Islamic 
banking industry to the entire national banking industry in Indonesia is just 
below six percent. Therefore, the behaviors and decisions in the Islamic 
banking industry remain heavily shadowed by the behaviors and decisions in 
the conventional banking industry. 
The coefficients of current and lagged asset size are both significant at the 
5 percent level. These coefficients' negative and positive signs indicate that 
current asset size reduces credit risk, while lagged asset size increases credit 
risk. This may indicate a more complex relationship between asset size and 
credit risk, beyond the "diversification" versus the "too big to fail" hypotheses. 
The coefficient of lagged financing is positive and significant at the 1 
percent level. Thus, in line with previous findings in Jimenez and Saurina 
(2005), Quagliariello (2007), and Espinoza and Prasad (2010), credit risk 
increases as financing increases.  
The coefficient of current profitability is negative and significant at the 5 
percent level. Holding other variables constant, credit risk tends to decrease 
as current profitability increases. This is consistent with the findings in Ghosh 
(2015), Chaibi and Ftiti (2015), and Haryono et al. (2016).  
The coefficient of lagged economic growth is negative and significant at 
least at the 10 percent level. This is in line with previous findings Messai and 
Jouini (2013), Chaibi and Ftiti (2015), Dimitrios et al. (2016), Ghosh (2015), 
Loihichi and Boujelbene (2016) that the higher economic growth, the lower is 
credit risk. The coefficient of current inflation is positive and significant at 
different percentage levels. This indicates that lagged inflation matters for 
credit risk. Holding other variables constant, an increase in current inflation 
will increase credit risk. 
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To analyze if there is a difference in the way current and lagged asset size, 
lagged financing, current profitability, lagging economic growth, and current 
inflation affect credit risk in Islamic as compared to the conventional banking 
industry, this paper reemploys dynamic panel regressions in equation (1) 
with two interaction terms. The first is an interaction term between the 
Islamic bank dummy and "current" bank-specific or macroeconomic 
variables. The second is an interaction term between the Islamic bank dummy 
and "lagged" bank-specific or macroeconomic variables. 
Table 3 presents the results from regressions with interaction terms 
between the Islamic bank dummy and current and lagged bank-specific 
variables. In column 1, the interaction term coefficient between the Islamic 
bank dummy and current asset size is significant at the 10 percent level. This 
indicates a difference in the current effect that asset size has on credit risk in 
Islamic as compared to the conventional banking industry. The positive sign 
of the interaction terms' coefficients indicates that holding other variables 
constant, credit risk tends to increase more in Islamic than in the conventional 
banking industry as current asset size increases. Meanwhile, the interaction 
term coefficient between the Islamic bank dummy and lagged asset size is not 
significant. Thus, there is no indication that the way credit risk is affected by 
lagged asset size is different in Islamic compared to the conventional banking 
industry.  
In column 4, the coefficients of the interaction terms between the Islamic 
bank dummy and lagged financing are significant at the 5 percent level. This 
implies a significant difference in how credit risk in Islamic and conventional 
banking industries is affected by lagged financing. Holding other variables 
constant, credit risk tends to increase more in Islamic than in the conventional 
banking industry as the lagged financing increases. In column 6, the 
coefficients of the interaction terms between the Islamic bank dummy and 
current profitability are significant at the 1 percent level. This suggests that 
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credit risk in Islamic and conventional banking industries is different in how 
they are affected by current profitability. 
Table 3. Difference in the way bank-specific variables affect credit risk 
 System GMM Estimators 
Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 3 
Dummy for Islamic banks  -5.833 0.590* 0.288* 
 (4.174) (0.308) (0.173) 
D Islamic*Bank asset size 0.986*   
 (0.590)   
D Islamic*Bank asset size (t-1) -0.633   
 (0.416)   
D Islamic*Bank capitalization  -5.406***  
  (1.786)  
D Islamic*Bank capitalization (t-1)  0.525  
  (2.504)  
D Islamic*Bank inefficiency   -0.014 
   (3.396) 
D Islamic*Bank inefficiency (t-1)   -6.275*** 
   (1.929) 
N observations 1,217 1,217 1,217 
N banks 106 106 106 
Second order test 0.860 0.831 0.807 
Sargan test 0.356 0.432 0.358 
 System GMM Estimators 
 Regression 4 Regression 5 Regression 6 
D Islamic*Bank financing 3.667**   
 (1.744)   
D Islamic*Bank financing (t-1) 7.611**   
 (3.334)   
D Islamic*Bank income diver  -2.515*  
  (1.351)  
D Islamic*Bank income diver (t-1)  -0.598  
  (1.592)  
D Islamic*Bank profitability   -0.155*** 
   (0.057) 
D Islamic*Bank profitability (t-1)   0.048 
   (0.035) 
N observations 1,217 1,217 1,217 
N banks 106 106 106 
Second order test 0.757 0.907 0.774 
Sargan test 0.255 0.358 0.267 
Note: Each regression includes a constant,  a dummy for 50 percent ownership concentration, a 
dummy for foreign banks, a dummy for local-government-owned banks and a dummy for 
central-government-owned banks. In addition, each regression includes bank specific variables, 
macroeconomic variables, a dummy for the 2008 global financial crisis and a dummy for post 
crisis. Values in parentheses refer to robust standard errors. ***, ** and * denote significance 
at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level respectively.  
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Even though the effect of current capitalization, lagged inefficiency, and 
current financing on credit risk, in general, is not statistically significant, there 
is a likelihood that their effect differs on credit risk in Islamic as compared to 
the conventional banking industry. For example, in column 2, the coefficients 
of the interaction terms between the Islamic bank dummy and current 
capitalization are significant. Similarly, in columns 3 and 4, the interaction 
term coefficient between the Islamic bank dummy and lagged inefficiency and 
between the Islamic bank dummy and current financing is significant at the 1 
and 5 percent level, respectively. 
Table 4. Difference in the way macroeconomic variables affect credit risk 
 System GMM Estimators 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Dummy for Islamic banks 0.181 -0.052 -0.300 
 (0.970) (0.181) (0.390) 
D Islamic banks * Ec growth -0.349**   
 (0.152)   
D Islamic * Ec growth (t-1) 0.296**   
 (0.136)   
D Islamic * Unemployment  -0.002  
  (0.013)  
D Islamic * Unemployment (t-1)  0.006  
  (0.012)  
D Islamic * Inflation   -0.018 
   (0.032) 
D Islamic * Inflation (t-1)   0.057** 
   (0.029) 
N observations 1,217 1,217 1,217 
N banks 106 106 106 
Second order test 0.885 0.869 0.875 
Sargan test 0.361 0.355 0.259 
Note: The dependent variable is the logit transformation of NPF or NPL ratio. Each regression 
includes a constant, a dummy for 50 percent ownership concentration, a dummy for foreign 
banks, a dummy for local-government-owned banks and a dummy for central-government-
owned banks. In addition, each regression includes bank specific variables, macroeconomic 
variables, a dummy for the 2008 global financial crisis and a dummy for post global financial 
crisis. Bank specific variables are assumed to be predetermined, while dummies and 
macroeconomic variables are all assumed to be strictly exogenous. Values in parenthe ses refer 
to robust standard errors. The asterisks ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 
percent level respectively. 
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Table 4 presents the results from regressions with interaction terms 
between the Islamic bank dummy and current and lagged macroeconomic 
variables. In column 1, the coefficients of the interaction terms between the 
Islamic bank dummy and lagged economic growth is significant at the 5 
percent level. The positive sign of the interaction terms' coefficients indicates 
that holding other variables constant, credit risk tends to increase more in 
Islamic than in conventional banking industry as the lagged economic growth 
increases. In column 3, the interaction term coefficient between the Islamic 
bank dummy and current inflation is not significant. There is thus no 
significant difference in the way credit risk in Islamic and conventional 
banking industries is affected by current inflation. 
Even though the effect of current economic growth and lagged inflation 
on credit risk, in general, is not statistically significant, there is a likelihood that 
their effect differs on credit risk in Islamic compared to credit risk in the 
conventional banking industry. This is because the coefficients of the 
interaction terms between these two variables and the Islamic bank dummy 
are respectively significant at the 5 percent level. 
Conclusion 
This paper has compared the level of credit risk and how much risk is 
affected by its determinants in Islamic and conventional banking industries. 
Based on the results, it is concluded that there is no significant difference in 
the level of the credit risk of Islamic banks compared to the level of the credit 
risk of conventional banks. It is also concluded that credit risk is significantly 
affected by current and lagged asset size, lagged financing, current 
profitability, lagged economic growth, and current inflation. Lagged financing, 
current profitability, and lagged economic growth affect credit risk is 
remarkably different in the Islamic banking industry than in the conventional 
banking industry. 
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This paper has several implications. The first is that the banking 
authorities, investors, and depositors should not take any presumption about 
the level of credit risk in Islamic compared to conventional banking industries. 
Despite the theoretical prediction, that Islamic banks suffer from adverse 
selection and asymmetric information, the credit risk level in Islamic banking 
is not necessarily higher than the level of credit risk in conventional banking. 
The use of profit and loss sharing schemes may induce Islamic banks to assess 
and discipline their partners adequately, reducing the difference between the 
level of credit risk in the Islamic banking industry and the conventional 
banking industry. Moreover, in practice, Islamic banks rely more on Murabaha 
than on mudarabah and musharakah, making the credit risk in Islamic banking 
pretty much similar to the level of credit risk in the conventional banking 
industry. The second implication is that, even though there is no difference in 
the level of Islamic banks' credit risk compared to that of conventional banks, 
policies aimed to envisage credit risk should be made specific to each banking 
industry. Several determinants affect credit risk differently in the Islamic 
banking industry than in the conventional banking industry. Policies ignoring 
such differences may, therefore, not lead to satisfactory results. 
Future research needs to consider the fact that financing in Islamic and 
conventional banking industries consists of various elements. For example, it 
is common to have consumer financing, mortgage financing, and business 
financing (Louzis et al. 2012). Therefore, if a better understanding of the 
nature of credit risk in Islamic and conventional banking industries is to be 
achieved, analysis on credit risk associated with each of these classes would 
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